Filters
Question type

Study Flashcards

Even when allowed to collude, firms in an oligopoly may choose to cheat on their agreements with the rest of the cartel. Why?

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Individual profits can be incr...

View Answer

Table 17-8 For a certain small town, the table shows the demand schedule for water. Assume the marginal cost of supplying water is constant at $4 per bottle and there are no other costs. Table 17-8 For a certain small town, the table shows the demand schedule for water. Assume the marginal cost of supplying water is constant at $4 per bottle and there are no other costs.   -Refer to Table 17-8. If there were only one supplier of water, what would be the price and quantity? A) The price would be $7 per gallon and the quantity would be 600 gallons. B) The price would be $6 per gallon and the quantity would be 800 gallons. C) The price would be $5 per gallon and the quantity would be 1000 gallons. D) The price would be $4 per gallon and the quantity would be 1200 gallons. -Refer to Table 17-8. If there were only one supplier of water, what would be the price and quantity?


A) The price would be $7 per gallon and the quantity would be 600 gallons.
B) The price would be $6 per gallon and the quantity would be 800 gallons.
C) The price would be $5 per gallon and the quantity would be 1000 gallons.
D) The price would be $4 per gallon and the quantity would be 1200 gallons.

E) B) and C)
F) A) and D)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below. Table 17-6 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Kunal and Naj, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Kunal and Naj work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump, to bring the water to town, and to sell it at whatever price the market will bear. Assume Kunal and Naj can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost of water equals zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water are shown in the table below.   -Refer to Table 17-6. As long as Kunal and Naj operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will their combined weekly revenue amount to? A) $450 B) $675 C) $875 D) $900 -Refer to Table 17-6. As long as Kunal and Naj operate as a profit-maximizing monopoly, what will their combined weekly revenue amount to?


A) $450
B) $675
C) $875
D) $900

E) A) and C)
F) A) and B)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

In the U.S. government's 1998 suit against the Microsoft Corporation, a central issue was whether Microsoft should be allowed to integrate its Internet browser into its Windows operating system. Microsoft responded that


A) this integration of products is an example of tying, and the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled that tying is a perfectly acceptable and legal business practice.
B) this integration of products is an example of resale price maintenance, and the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently ruled that fair trade is a perfectly acceptable and legal business practice.
C) putting new features into old products is a natural part of technological practice.
D) it would discontinue this integration of products, provided a speedy resolution of the government's case could be reached.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The practice of tying is illegal on the grounds that


A) it allows firms to expand their market power.
B) it allows firms to form collusive arrangements.
C) it prevents firms from forming collusive agreements.
D) the Sherman Act explicitly prohibited such agreements.

E) A) and B)
F) C) and D)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The Sherman Antitrust Act prohibits executives of competing companies from


A) fixing prices, but it does not prohibit them from talking about fixing prices.
B) even talking about fixing prices.
C) sharing with one another their knowledge of game theory.
D) failing to stand by agreements that they had made with one another.

E) B) and D)
F) B) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Scenario 17-4. ​ Consider two cigarette companies, PM Inc. and Brown Inc. If neither company advertises, the two companies split the market and earn $50 million each. If they both advertise, they again split the market, but profits are lower by $10 million since each company must bear the cost of advertising. Yet if one company advertises while the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. In this case, the company that advertises earns $60 million while the company that does not advertise earns only $30 million. -Refer to Scenario 17-4. What will these two companies do if they behave as individual profit maximizers?


A) Neither company will advertise.
B) Both companies will advertise.
C) One company will advertise, the other will not.
D) There is no way of knowing without knowing how many customers are stolen through advertising.

E) A) and B)
F) C) and D)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost. Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost.   -Refer to Table 17-11. If ABC and XYZ operate to jointly maximize profits, then what quantity is sold? A) 25 B) 30 C) 35 D) 40 -Refer to Table 17-11. If ABC and XYZ operate to jointly maximize profits, then what quantity is sold?


A) 25
B) 30
C) 35
D) 40

E) A) and D)
F) B) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Which government entity is charged with investigating and enforcing antitrust laws?


A) the U.S. Justice Department
B) the U.S. Commerce Department
C) the U.S. Treasury Department
D) the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

A cooperative agreement among oligopolists is less likely to be maintained,


A) the greater the number of oligopolists.
B) the larger the number of buyers of the oligopolists' product.
C) the smaller the number of buyers of the oligopolists' product.
D) the more likely it is that the game among the oligopolists will be played over and over again.

E) A) and C)
F) A) and B)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Explain how the output effect and the price effect influence the production decision of the individual oligopolist.

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Since the individual oligopolist faces a...

View Answer

Predatory pricing occurs when


A) firms collude to set prices. Economists are certain this practice is profitable.
B) firms collude to set prices. Economists are skeptical that this practice is profitable.
C) A monopolist decreases its prices to maintain its monopoly. Economists are certain this practice is profitable.
D) A monopolist decreases its prices to maintain its monopoly. Economists are skeptical that this practice is profitable.

E) A) and B)
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

As the number of firms in an oligopoly increases, the magnitude of the


A) output effect increases.
B) output effect decreases.
C) price effect increases.
D) price effect decreases.

E) A) and B)
F) A) and C)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The practice of tying is used to


A) enhance the enforcement of antitrust laws.
B) encourage the enforcement of collusive agreements.
C) control the retail price of a collection of related products.
D) package products to sell at a combined price closer to a buyer's total willingness to pay.

E) None of the above
F) All of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status with Farland (a mythical nation) . Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland. Table 17-27 Each year the United States considers renewal of Most Favored Nation (MFN)  trading status with Farland (a mythical nation) . Historically, legislators have made threats of not renewing MFN status because of human rights abuses in Farland. The non-renewal of MFN trading status is likely to involve some retaliatory measures by Farland. The payoff table below shows the potential economic gains associated with a game in which Farland may impose trade sanctions against U.S. firms and the United States may not renew MFN status with Farland. The table contains the dollar value of all trade-flow benefits to the United States and Farland.   -Refer to Table 17-27. If trade negotiators are able to communicate effectively about the consequences of various trade policies (i.e., enter into an agreement about the policy they should adopt) , then we would expect the countries to agree to which outcome? A) United States $35 b and Farland $285 b B) United States $65 b and Farland $75 b C) United States $140 b and Farland $5 b D) United States $130 b and Farland $275 b -Refer to Table 17-27. If trade negotiators are able to communicate effectively about the consequences of various trade policies (i.e., enter into an agreement about the policy they should adopt) , then we would expect the countries to agree to which outcome?


A) United States $35 b and Farland $285 b
B) United States $65 b and Farland $75 b
C) United States $140 b and Farland $5 b
D) United States $130 b and Farland $275 b

E) All of the above
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Scenario 17-4. ​ Consider two cigarette companies, PM Inc. and Brown Inc. If neither company advertises, the two companies split the market and earn $50 million each. If they both advertise, they again split the market, but profits are lower by $10 million since each company must bear the cost of advertising. Yet if one company advertises while the other does not, the one that advertises attracts customers from the other. In this case, the company that advertises earns $60 million while the company that does not advertise earns only $30 million. -Refer to Scenario 17-4. In 1971, Congress passed a law that banned cigarette advertising on television. If cigarette companies are profit maximizers, it is likely that


A) neither company opposed the ban on advertising.
B) Brown Inc. sued the federal government on grounds that the ban constitutes a civil rights violation.
C) both companies sued the federal government on grounds that the ban constitutes a civil rights violation.
D) both companies retaliated with black-market operations.

E) A) and C)
F) A) and D)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Table 17-14 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) . Table 17-14 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) .   -Refer to Table 17-14. If player A chooses his/her best strategy, player B should A) choose left and earn a payoff of 4. B) choose left and earn a payoff of 6. C) choose right and earn a payoff of 2. D) choose right and earn a payoff of 0. -Refer to Table 17-14. If player A chooses his/her best strategy, player B should


A) choose left and earn a payoff of 4.
B) choose left and earn a payoff of 6.
C) choose right and earn a payoff of 2.
D) choose right and earn a payoff of 0.

E) All of the above
F) A) and B)

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

When the prisoners' dilemma game is generalized to describe situations other than those that literally involve two prisoners, we see that cooperation between the players of the game


A) can be difficult to maintain, but only when cooperation would make at least one of the players of the game worse off.
B) can be difficult to maintain, even when cooperation would make both players of the game better off.
C) always works to the benefit of society as a whole.
D) always works to the detriment of society as a whole.

E) A) and B)
F) None of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Suppose the market for home-grown peppers in the town of Smallville is comprised of two farmers. Suppose the two farmers try to collude. Explain why their collusion might not be successful.

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

The two farmers might try to determine t...

View Answer

Other things the same, in which case is the quantity produced the highest?


A) There is one firm.
B) There are two firms that successfully collude.
C) There are two firms in Nash equilibrium.
D) There are a very large number of firms.

E) A) and C)
F) All of the above

Correct Answer

verifed

verified

Showing 141 - 160 of 522

Related Exams

Show Answer