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Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning) , or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows: Figure 17-3. Hector and Bart are roommates. On a particular day, their apartment needs to be cleaned. Each person has to decide whether to take part in cleaning. At the end of the day, either the apartment will be completely clean (if one or both roommates take part in cleaning) , or it will remain dirty (if neither roommate cleans) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy)  to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows:   -Refer to Figure 17-3. The possible outcome in which both Hector and Bart clean is analogous to which of the following outcomes of the duopoly game? A) The duopolists collude to achieve the monopoly outcome. B) The duopolists collude to achieve the monopolistically-competitive outcome. C) The outcome is the one that is most preferable for consumers of the duopolists' product. D) The outcome is the one that is least preferable for both the duopolists and for the consumers of their product. -Refer to Figure 17-3. The possible outcome in which both Hector and Bart clean is analogous to which of the following outcomes of the duopoly game?


A) The duopolists collude to achieve the monopoly outcome.
B) The duopolists collude to achieve the monopolistically-competitive outcome.
C) The outcome is the one that is most preferable for consumers of the duopolists' product.
D) The outcome is the one that is least preferable for both the duopolists and for the consumers of their product.

E) A) and D)
F) None of the above

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The argument that consumers will not be willing to pay any more for two items sold as one than they would for the two items sold separately is used to justify the legality of which of the following?


A) resale price maintenance
B) tying
C) predatory pricing
D) free-riding

E) A) and D)
F) None of the above

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Table 17-37​ Two restaurants with a focus on Mexican dining operate in Texama. Both Mitch's Mexican and Tim's Tacos need to decide whether to add Zesty Queso or Fresh Guacamole to their menus. The circumstances are that each firm wants to add only one of the two choices on their menu. Below you will find the profits for the stores, shown as: (1) the payoff to Mitch; (2) the payoff to Tim. Table 17-37​ Two restaurants with a focus on Mexican dining operate in Texama. Both Mitch's Mexican and Tim's Tacos need to decide whether to add Zesty Queso or Fresh Guacamole to their menus. The circumstances are that each firm wants to add only one of the two choices on their menu. Below you will find the profits for the stores, shown as: (1)  the payoff to Mitch; (2)  the payoff to Tim.   ​ -Refer to Table 17-37. If Mitch's Mexican chooses Zesty Queso then Tim's Tacos will select its best strategy and choose ____ ; if Mitch's Mexican chooses Fresh Guacamole then Tim's Tacos will select its best strategy and choose _____. A) ​Zesty Queso, Zesty Queso B) ​Zesty Queso, Fresh Guacamole C) ​Fresh Guacamole, Zesty Queso D) ​Fresh Guacamole, Fresh Guacamole ​ -Refer to Table 17-37. If Mitch's Mexican chooses Zesty Queso then Tim's Tacos will select its best strategy and choose ____ ; if Mitch's Mexican chooses Fresh Guacamole then Tim's Tacos will select its best strategy and choose _____.


A) ​Zesty Queso, Zesty Queso
B) ​Zesty Queso, Fresh Guacamole
C) ​Fresh Guacamole, Zesty Queso
D) ​Fresh Guacamole, Fresh Guacamole

E) A) and D)
F) B) and C)

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Ford and General Motors are considering expanding into the Vietnamese automobile market. Devise a simple prisoners' dilemma game to demonstrate the strategic considerations that are relevant to this decision.

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The answer should present two strategies...

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Table 17-2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Table 17-2 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below:   -Refer to Table 17-2. Suppose that Abby and Brad work together to operate as a profit-maximizing monopolist. How many gallons of water will be produced and sold? A) 4 gallons B) 5 gallons C) 6 gallons D) 8 gallons -Refer to Table 17-2. Suppose that Abby and Brad work together to operate as a profit-maximizing monopolist. How many gallons of water will be produced and sold?


A) 4 gallons
B) 5 gallons
C) 6 gallons
D) 8 gallons

E) B) and C)
F) A) and D)

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Scenario 17-2. ​ Imagine that two oil companies, BQ and Exxoff, own adjacent oil fields. Under the fields is a common pool of oil worth $144 million. Drilling a well to recover oil costs $5 million per well. If each company drills one well, each will get half of the oil and earn a $67 million profit ($72 million in revenue - $5 million in costs) . Assume that having X percent of the total wells means that a company will collect X percent of the total revenue. -Refer to Scenario 17-2. If BQ were to drill a second well and Exxoff also drilled a second well, what would BQ's profit be?


A) $31 million
B) $62 million
C) $67 million
D) $86 million

E) B) and D)
F) A) and D)

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If duopoly firms that are not colluding were able to successfully collude, then


A) price and quantity would rise.
B) price and quantity would fall.
C) price would rise and quantity would fall.
D) price would fall and quantity would rise.

E) A) and B)
F) B) and C)

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Game theory is just as necessary for understanding competitive or monopoly markets as it is for understanding oligopolistic markets.

A) True
B) False

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Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost. Table 17-11 Only two firms, ABC and XYZ, sell a particular product. The table below shows the demand curve for their product. Each firm has the same constant marginal cost of $8 and zero fixed cost.   -Refer to Table 17-11. ABC and XYZ agree to jointly maximize profits. If ABC and XYZ each break the agreement and each produce 5 more than agreed upon, how much less profit does each make, compared to the profit at to the cartel output? A) $5 B) $20 C) $60 D) $90 -Refer to Table 17-11. ABC and XYZ agree to jointly maximize profits. If ABC and XYZ each break the agreement and each produce 5 more than agreed upon, how much less profit does each make, compared to the profit at to the cartel output?


A) $5
B) $20
C) $60
D) $90

E) B) and D)
F) None of the above

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In the prisoners' dilemma game with Bonnie and Clyde as the players, the likely outcome is one


A) in which neither Bonnie nor Clyde confesses.
B) in which both Bonnie and Clyde confess.
C) that involves neither Bonnie nor Clyde pursuing a dominant strategy.
D) that is ideal in terms of Bonnie's self-interest and in terms of Clyde's self-interest.

E) A) and D)
F) B) and C)

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Figure 17-4. Aaron and Ed are roommates. After a big snowstorm, their driveway needs to be shoveled. Each person has to decide whether to take part in shoveling the driveway. At the end of the day, either the driveway will be shoveled (if one or both roommates take part in shoveling) , or it will remain unshoveled (if neither roommate shovels) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy) to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows: Figure 17-4. Aaron and Ed are roommates. After a big snowstorm, their driveway needs to be shoveled. Each person has to decide whether to take part in shoveling the driveway. At the end of the day, either the driveway will be shoveled (if one or both roommates take part in shoveling) , or it will remain unshoveled (if neither roommate shovels) . With happiness measured on a scale of 1 (very unhappy)  to 10 (very happy) , the possible outcomes are as follows:   -Refer to Figure 17-4. The dominant strategy for Ed is to A) shovel, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to shovel. B) shovel, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to refrain from shoveling. C) refrain from shoveling, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to shovel. D) refrain from shoveling, and there is no dominant strategy for Aaron. -Refer to Figure 17-4. The dominant strategy for Ed is to


A) shovel, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to shovel.
B) shovel, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to refrain from shoveling.
C) refrain from shoveling, and the dominant strategy for Aaron is to shovel.
D) refrain from shoveling, and there is no dominant strategy for Aaron.

E) C) and D)
F) B) and C)

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Tying is always profitable for a monopoly.

A) True
B) False

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Antitrust laws in general are used to


A) prevent oligopolists from acting in ways that make markets less competitive.
B) encourage oligopolists to pursue cooperative-interest at the expense of self-interest.
C) encourage frivolous lawsuits among competitive firms.
D) encourage all firms to cut production levels and cut prices.

E) B) and C)
F) None of the above

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Consider a game of the "Jack and Jill" type in which a market is a duopoly and each firm decides to produce either a "high" quantity of output or a "low" quantity of output. If the two firms successfully reach and maintain the cooperative outcome of the game, then


A) both the combined profit of the firms and total surplus are maximized.
B) the combined profit of the firms is maximized but total surplus is not maximized.
C) the combined profit of the firms is not maximized but total surplus is maximized.
D) neither the combined profit of the firms nor total surplus is maximized.

E) A) and C)
F) C) and D)

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Table 17-14 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) . Table 17-14 This table shows a game played between two players, A and B. The payoffs in the table are shown as (Payoff to A, Payoff to B) .   -Refer to Table 17-14. If both players choose their best strategies, player A will earn a payoff of A) 0. B) 2. C) 4. D) 6. -Refer to Table 17-14. If both players choose their best strategies, player A will earn a payoff of


A) 0.
B) 2.
C) 4.
D) 6.

E) B) and C)
F) A) and D)

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Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies. Figure 17-5. Two companies, ABC and QRS, are sellers in the same market. Each company decides whether to charge a high price or a low price. In the figure, the dollar amounts are payoffs and they represent annual profits for the two companies.   -Refer to Figure 17-5. Suppose we observe that the outcome of the game is one in which each company earns a profit of $10 million. This outcome A) is the result of each company pursuing its dominant strategy. B) is the result of cooperation between the two companies, and we know that a cooperative outcome is easy in a game such as this one. C) is the result of cooperation between the two companies, and we know that a cooperative outcome is difficult in a game such as this one. D) is the most likely outcome of the game, regardless of whether the two companies cooperate. -Refer to Figure 17-5. Suppose we observe that the outcome of the game is one in which each company earns a profit of $10 million. This outcome


A) is the result of each company pursuing its dominant strategy.
B) is the result of cooperation between the two companies, and we know that a cooperative outcome is easy in a game such as this one.
C) is the result of cooperation between the two companies, and we know that a cooperative outcome is difficult in a game such as this one.
D) is the most likely outcome of the game, regardless of whether the two companies cooperate.

E) A) and B)
F) None of the above

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Table 17-3 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk that is safe to drink. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce. They bring milk to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table below: Table 17-3 Imagine a small town in a remote area where only two residents, Maria and Miguel, own dairies that produce milk that is safe to drink. Each week Maria and Miguel work together to decide how many gallons of milk to produce. They bring milk to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Maria and Miguel can produce as much milk as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for milk is shown in the table below:   -Refer to Table 17-3. If this market for milk were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallons of milk would be produced and sold? A) 12 gallons B) 8 gallons C) 6 gallons D) 0 gallons -Refer to Table 17-3. If this market for milk were perfectly competitive instead of monopolistic, how many gallons of milk would be produced and sold?


A) 12 gallons
B) 8 gallons
C) 6 gallons
D) 0 gallons

E) A) and B)
F) B) and D)

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Table 17-10 The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product. Table 17-10 The table shows the demand schedule for a particular product.   -Refer to Table 17-10. Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms who have formed a cartel and are colluding to set the price and quantity in this market. If the marginal cost to produce this product is constant at $40 per unit, then what price will the cartel set in this market? A) $40 B) $50 C) $60 D) $70 -Refer to Table 17-10. Suppose the market for this product is served by two firms who have formed a cartel and are colluding to set the price and quantity in this market. If the marginal cost to produce this product is constant at $40 per unit, then what price will the cartel set in this market?


A) $40
B) $50
C) $60
D) $70

E) B) and D)
F) B) and C)

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Table 17-30 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below: Table 17-30 Imagine a small town in which only two residents, Abby and Brad, own wells that produce safe drinking water. Each week Abby and Brad work together to decide how many gallons of water to pump. They bring water to town and sell it at whatever price the market will bear. To keep things simple, suppose that Abby and Brad can pump as much water as they want without cost so that the marginal cost is zero. The weekly town demand schedule and total revenue schedule for water is shown in the table below:   -Refer to Table 17-30. Discuss the difference between the monopoly outcome and the Nash equilibrium. -Refer to Table 17-30. Discuss the difference between the monopoly outcome and the Nash equilibrium.

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The monopoly outcome occurs at the highe...

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What effect does the number of firms in an oligopoly have on the characteristics of the market?

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As the number of firms increas...

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